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AGREEMENT NOT TO CONTEST
Oklahoma. In Cook v" Morrison' testatrix died leaving a will
with three codicils. Certain of her heirs filed contests when the
will and codicils were presented for probate. The county court
decreed all the codicils were invalid on the ground of lack of
testamentary capacity and refused their admission to probate.
The part of the will held valid disposed of only a portion of
deceased's estate. On appeal to the district court, the contesting
heirs agreed with the residuary legatee under the first codicil that,
in consideration of certain payment to be made by him, they
would withdraw and dismiss their appeals, authorize the district
court to hold the will and the first codicil valid, aid him in any
future suit over the validity of the will, and bear a pro-rata share
of any adverse judgment. The district court approved and con-
firmed the stipulations, rendered judgment in accordance there-
with, and remanded the cause to the county court with directions
to admit the will and first codicil to probate. The present plaintiffs,
heirs of testatrix who had been omitted from the will and codicil
and who made no appearance in the county or district court, filed
a petition to vacate the judgment because it was void as beyond
the jurisdiction of the court and contrary to public policy. A de-
murrer to the plaintiff's petition was sustained on the ground that
no cause of action was stated.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the judgment was void
as beyond the jurisdiction of the court, saying the only issue to
be determined on appeal to the district court was the factum or
validity of the will. The judgment was held to be void on its face
and subject to attack at any time on motion or petition of a party
affected thereby, with no necessity of setting up a meritorious
defense.' A dissenting opinion argued the judgment was not void
on its face, since the judgment recited that the decree was based
1-... - Okla .............. 217 P. 2d 810 (1950).
2 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed.) § 1038.
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on the preponderance of the evidence, and there was a recital of
jurisdiction of the subject-matter and person.
The court also held the contract not to contest the will, the
ultimate purpose of which was to secure the probate of a will
which the parties had good reason to believe was an invalid will,
and to cut off other relatives, was void as contrary to public policy.
It was stated that a bona fide agreement by one interested in
testator's estate to refrain from contesting a will is valid.'
The result in this case is commendable; an agreement should
not bind persons who were not a party to it if they are interested
in the will.
CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS
Arkansas. In Lefeavre v. Pennington4 the executor of Dr. Pen-
nington's holographic will brought a proceeding to obtain a
construction of the residuary clause, which provided, "The Bal.
to be divided equally between all of our nephews and nieces on
my wife's side and my niece, Nathalee Pennington, of Lawrence-
burg, Tennessee." 5 The trial court held the will gave testator's
niece one-half. Appellants, twenty-two nephews and nieces on the
wife's side, contended that each residuary legatee should receive
1/23 of the residuary estate.
The court affirmed the holding of the trial court. The word
"between" in its literal sense was said to apply to only two
subjects, and if reference is to more than two, the proposition
should be "among"; however, the court recognized that most
people do not always observe this distinction and treated the
language as ambiguous. Testator's feelings toward various bene-
ficiaries were then looked to as an aid in arriving at testator's
intention. The following facts were held to show that testator had
a very warm feeling for Nathalee: the two corresponded often;
testator had visited her home in Tennessee; testator had given
her various gifts-a fountain pen, a $500 United States bond,
3 4 PAGE, WrLLs (Lifetime Ed. 1941) § 1759.
4 ------------ Ark .............. 230 S. W. 2d 46 (1950).
5230 S. W. 2d at 47.
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and ten dollars a month for five months while Nathalee was ill.
It was noted that testator described appellants merely as a class,
apparently not caring whether it increased or decreased, while
he singled Nathalee out. As a final argument, the majority of the
court said that a per capita distribution would be an unnatural
division of the estate, since the usual thing is to have a half-and-
half division between the kin on the husband's side and the kin
on the wife's side in a situation like this.
The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the will was holographic,
and, therefore, it was proper not to base the case on the technical
use of the word "between." It points out that Nathalee was the
only one who testified as to the fact that she was testator's favorite
niece and that he had a warm affection for her; that testator saw
her only twice since her early childhood; that testator lived with
his wife's sister, Mrs. Anderson, after his wife died; that some
of the legatees are this sister's children; that a son of Mrs. Ander-
son was named executor without bond; that the executor's judgment
was to be final in all matters as to the sale of decedent's property;
that testator listed Nathalee by name because he did not want to
leave anything to Nathalee's four brothers.
The majority opinion seems to have ignored most of the matters
brought up by the dissenting opinion in arriving at testator's intent.
It is difficult enough to arrive at the intent of a live person, much
less one who is dead, but the court seems to have failed to meet
all the facts. If the facts set out in the dissenting opinion did not
justify a different result, they at least justified a discussion by the
majority opinion.
Page states that the presumption is that testator intended to
make the named person a member of the entire class, where all
the members are of the same degree of relationship, but that this
presumption is disregarded more often than not.6
Louisiana. In Succession of Tertrou7 testatrix executed an holo-
graphic will in which she made several bequests of "gold bonds"
6 3 PAcE, WILLS (Lifetime Ed. 1941) § 1083.
7 ............ La --- - ,47 So. 2d 681 (1950).
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in named amounts. A typical example of the bequests was as
follows: "I bequeath to the Community Chest the sum of one
thousand dollars $1000 in Gold Bond."' The contention was
made that this was a bequest of a specific thing which was adeemed
by extinction. The court held ademption did not occur. It said that
"gold bonds" is a generic term and does not apply to a particular
bond, when it can be seen from the entire will that testatrix used
the words "bonds" and "money" indiscriminately and intended
that bequests were to be paid either in cash or with bonds. An
example given of such indiscriminate use was, ".... [I]f there
is any money left, 'after paying all the legacies,' it is to be given
to the Charity Hospital of New Orleans."9 The court said that
this was merely a bequest of a sum of money which testatrix had
at the time invested in bonds. At the time of her death she actually
had four gold bonds; twelve more were payable in gold coin of
the United States; these sixteen bonds were more than enough to
pay each legacy except one.
The goal in any case such as this is to find the testator's intent;
this court did an excellent job in attaining that goal.
Oklahoma. In Johnson v. Johnson"° testator devised property
to his wife for life with an unconditional right to sell, remainder
to his children. After stating that the wife had an unconditional
right to sell, the will set forth the following provision: ". . . [W] ith
the right and power of the said Ollie M. Johnson to use the income
from such property or the proceeds from any sale thereof or the
sale of any interest therein, as she may see fit, either for the
purpose of reinvestment for the benefit of my estate or for her
personal or family support."" The petition alleged that this
provision made the will ambiguous and that the authority to sell
was restricted to purposes of reinvestment, support of the wife and
her family. The court held that the wife had the power to sell the
real estate and convey a fee simple title. The limitation in the will
8 47 So. 2d at 682.
9 Ibid.
10 ------------ Okla ------------, 225 P. 2d 805 (1950).
11225 P. 2d at 806.
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related only to the use of the income or proceeds, not to the sale.
The interest devised to the eighteen children was a contingent
remainder. The court added that the wife could use the proceeds
in whole for reinvestment or for her personal or family support.
CONTRACT TO DEVISE PROPERTY
Arkansas. Brunk v. Merchants National Bank 2 was a suit filed
by Merchants National Bank as executor of the estate of George
Brinkman for construction of his will. A husband and wife had
executed mutual or reciprocal wills; both wills had a provision
that certain property was to go to Lillian Trapp, who had lived
with them from the age of seven to nineteen. During this time she
turned over wages to them with the understanding that she would
share in their estate as though she were their natural child. The
wife died first; the husband executed a deed to the property but
did not deliver it to Lillian; instead, he placed it in a safe deposit
box. The lower court's decree vested title in Lillian.
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the deed was ineffective
due to lack of delivery but that there was a valid contract to
devise the property between the husband and wife and Lillian.
It was stated that the execution of such a will is not of itself
evidence of a contract to devise property, but that in this case
there was additional evidence in that the husband and wife had
taken Lillian's wages upon the promise that they would devise
the property to her. There was evidence that the husband had
always talked of the property as belonging to Lillian. The re-
quirement that the evidence of the contract be clear, cogent, satis-
factory and convincing was met.
The court followed the general rule that a contract to make a
will is valid even if a third party is the beneficiary. 8 It seems
that the court could have found a contract either between the
husband and wife, or a contract between the husband and wife
as one party and Lillian as the other party.
12 ------- Ark -------------- 230 S. W. 2d 932 (1950).
"- 4 PAGE, WILLS (Lifetime Ed. 1941) §§ 1707, 1712.
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JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS
Arkansas. Proceedings were brought in George v. Smith 4 by
Henry P. Smith, a brother of deceased, opposed by Mary George,
a sister, and others, for the probate of a document alleged to be
the will of Peter M. Smith, deceased. Peter M. Smith drew up
a joint and mutual will in his own handwriting. He and his
brother, James T. Smith, signed it, and a notary public witnessed
the execution. At the death of either of the brothers, the property
was to go to the other. The will contained the following provision:
"If both of the makers * * * should pass away, all of our * * *
property shall go to our brother, William I. Smith"' 5 The brothers
were joint owners of real and personal property worth a little
more than $10,000. Peter died in May, 1948; James died in
August, 1948; the brother William referred to in the will died
in February, 1949.
The court held that this instrument was the valid holographic
will of Peter Smith but not of James Smith because it was not
in his handwriting; nor was it a valid non-holographic will as to
James because there was only one witness. Joint wills were said
not to be per se invalid but could be upheld if enjoyment of the
property was not postponed to the death of the survivor. The
clause stating how the property was to be disposed of if both of
the makers of the will should pass away was held not an attempt
to postpone the enjoyment of the property to the death of the
survivor, the court reasoning that the brothers were thinking of
a common disaster or concurring deaths.
There were two dissenting opinions. One dissent was on the
ground the will was to take effect only on the death of the survivor.
The other dissent was on the ground that a joint and mutual will
must be valid as to both parties or it will be valid as to neither.
It appears that the court managed to carry out the testator's
intentions in the light of the circumstances. The case seems to be
in line with the authorities. 6
"4216 Ark. 896, 227 S. W. 2d 952 (1950).
15 227 S. W. 2d at 952.
161 PAcE, Wu.Ls (Lifetime Ed. 1941) § 104.
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REVOCATION BY CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES.
Arkansas. In Mosey v. Mosely 7 testator made a will in favor
of his first wife during their marriage. In 1945 testator and his
first wife were divorced and made a property settlement. Testator
married defendant second wife and died without revoking the
will. The probate judge held the will was revoked by the divorce
and property settlement. The supreme court reversed the trial
court. A statute provided that no will should be revoked otherwise
than by another written instrument executed with the same for-
malities, or by burning, tearing, cancellation, obliteration, or
destruction, either by testator or by some other person in his
presence and by his direction and consent.'" The court held the
methods listed in the statute were exclusive.
The present Probate Code of Arkansas provides that if a testator
is divorced after making his will, all provisions in favor of the
divorced spouse are revoked. 9 Testator died June 28, 1949,
three days before the effective date of the Code.
Logically, no fault can be found with such a decision; this is
the normal holding in a jurisdiction having this type of statute."
As to whether such a decision carries out the intent of the testator,
arguments can be made on both sides. It is odd to think of a man
wanting a divorced wife to share in his estate. It is safe to state
most divorced people hold little love for each other. However, if
such a feeling existed, does it not seem highly probable that one
of the husband's first acts after getting a divorce would be to
change his will? Regardless of the answer, the present statutory
law of Arkansas resolves the question by declaring the will revoked
by subsequent divorce.
John G. Street, Jr.
17 - ..-.-.Ark ----- ,231 S. W. 2d 99 (1950).
18ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 60-113.
19 ARK. STAT. 1947 ANN. § 60.407.
2 0Cases are cited in the principal decision, 231 S. W. 2d at 100; see 1 PAGE, WILLIS
(Lifetime Ed. 1941) § 488.
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